The hard road to presentism


Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

15 Citations (Scopus)


It is a common criticism of presentism - the view according to which only the present exists - that it errs against truthmaker theory. Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed by restricting truthmaker maximalism (the view that all truths have truthmakers), maintaining that propositions concerning the past are not made true by anything, but are true nonetheless. Support for this view is typically garnered from the case for negative existential propositions, which some philosophers contend are exceptions to truthmaker maximalism. In this article, we argue that a 'no truthmakers' approach to the truthmaker objection is critically flawed.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)314-335
Number of pages22
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Issue number3
Early online date28 Mar 2014
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2014

Bibliographical note

Research on this article was funded by a John Templeton Foundation grant held by Huw Price, Alex Holcombe, Kristie Miller and Dean Rickles, entitled: New Agendas for the Study of Time: Connecting the Disciplines.


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