The hard road to presentism

Jamin ASAY, Sam BARON

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It is a common criticism of presentism - the view according to which only the present exists - that it errs against truthmaker theory. Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed by restricting truthmaker maximalism (the view that all truths have truthmakers), maintaining that propositions concerning the past are not made true by anything, but are true nonetheless. Support for this view is typically garnered from the case for negative existential propositions, which some philosophers contend are exceptions to truthmaker maximalism. In this article, we argue that a 'no truthmakers' approach to the truthmaker objection is critically flawed.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)314-335
Number of pages22
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume95
Issue number3
Early online date28 Mar 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2014

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Presentism
Truthmakers
Maximalism
Criticism
Philosopher

Bibliographical note

Research on this article was funded by a John Templeton Foundation grant held by Huw Price, Alex Holcombe, Kristie Miller and Dean Rickles, entitled: New Agendas for the Study of Time: Connecting the Disciplines.

Cite this

ASAY, Jamin ; BARON, Sam. / The hard road to presentism. In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 2014 ; Vol. 95, No. 3. pp. 314-335.
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The hard road to presentism. / ASAY, Jamin; BARON, Sam.

In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 95, No. 3, 09.2014, p. 314-335.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

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