Abstract
This study assesses the effectiveness of the Hong Kong Code on Corporate Governance Practices (CG Code) in protecting shareholders’ interests with respect to directors’ remuneration by examining whether directors’ remuneration is affected by independent non-executive directors where the chairman of the board is a family member. Findings show that where the number of independent non-executive directors on the remuneration committee is high, the committee acts as a means of control, leading to lower directors’ remuneration than in situations where family members have more influence on remuneration committee decisions.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-17 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | Research in Business and Economics Journal |
Volume | 3 |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jul 2011 |
Keywords
- Hong Kong Code on Corporate Governance Practices
- corporate governance
- director remuneration
- executive pay
- remuneration committee