Abstract
This article develops a new version of instrumentalism, in light of progress in the realism debate in recent decades, and thereby defends the view that instrumentalism remains a viable philosophical position on science. The key idea is that talk of unobservable objects should be taken literally only when those objects are assigned properties (or described in terms of analogies involving things) with which we are experientially (or otherwise) acquainted. This is derivative from the instrumentalist tradition insofar as the distinction between unobservable and observable is taken to have significance with respect to meaning.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1200-1211 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Philosophy of Science |
Volume | 78 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2011 |
Bibliographical note
Paper presented at the Meeting of the Philosophy-of-Science-Association (PSA), Nov 04-06, 2010, Montreal, Canada.Funding
This research was supported by the British Academy.