Abstract
It is a common view that the axioms of probability can be derived from the following assumptions: (a) probabilities reflect (rational) degrees of belief, (b) degrees of belief can be measured as betting quotients; and (c) a rational agent must select betting quotients that are coherent. In this paper, I argue that a consideration of reasonable betting behaviour, with respect to the alleged derivation of the first axiom of probability, suggests that (b) and (c) are incorrect. In particular, I show how a rational agent might assign a ‘probability’ of zero to an event which she is sure will occur.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 65-71 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | Studia Logica |
| Volume | 87 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Oct 2007 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
The same paper is presented at the 2006 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom, July 2006.Keywords
- Dutch Book
- coherence
- degree of belief
- probabolistic theories of rationality
- subjective interpretation of probability