The insufficiency of the Dutch Book argument

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It is a common view that the axioms of probability can be derived from the following assumptions: (a) probabilities reflect (rational) degrees of belief, (b) degrees of belief can be measured as betting quotients; and (c) a rational agent must select betting quotients that are coherent. In this paper, I argue that a consideration of reasonable betting behaviour, with respect to the alleged derivation of the first axiom of probability, suggests that (b) and (c) are incorrect. In particular, I show how a rational agent might assign a ‘probability’ of zero to an event which she is sure will occur.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)65-71
Number of pages7
JournalStudia Logica
Volume87
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2007
Externally publishedYes

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Quotient
Axiom
Axioms
Assign
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Beliefs
Degree of Belief

Bibliographical note

The same paper is presented at the 2006 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom, July 2006.

Keywords

  • Dutch Book
  • coherence
  • degree of belief
  • probabolistic theories of rationality
  • subjective interpretation of probability

Cite this

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title = "The insufficiency of the Dutch Book argument",
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The insufficiency of the Dutch Book argument. / ROWBOTTOM, Darrell Patrick.

In: Studia Logica, Vol. 87, No. 1, 01.10.2007, p. 65-71.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

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KW - degree of belief

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