### Abstract

Original language | English |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 65-71 |

Number of pages | 7 |

Journal | Studia Logica |

Volume | 87 |

Issue number | 1 |

DOIs | |

Publication status | Published - 1 Oct 2007 |

Externally published | Yes |

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### Bibliographical note

The same paper is presented at the 2006 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom, July 2006.### Keywords

- Dutch Book
- coherence
- degree of belief
- probabolistic theories of rationality
- subjective interpretation of probability

### Cite this

}

*Studia Logica*, vol. 87, no. 1, pp. 65-71. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9077-2

**The insufficiency of the Dutch Book argument.** / ROWBOTTOM, Darrell Patrick.

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed)

TY - JOUR

T1 - The insufficiency of the Dutch Book argument

AU - ROWBOTTOM, Darrell Patrick

N1 - The same paper is presented at the 2006 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom, July 2006.

PY - 2007/10/1

Y1 - 2007/10/1

N2 - It is a common view that the axioms of probability can be derived from the following assumptions: (a) probabilities reflect (rational) degrees of belief, (b) degrees of belief can be measured as betting quotients; and (c) a rational agent must select betting quotients that are coherent. In this paper, I argue that a consideration of reasonable betting behaviour, with respect to the alleged derivation of the first axiom of probability, suggests that (b) and (c) are incorrect. In particular, I show how a rational agent might assign a ‘probability’ of zero to an event which she is sure will occur.

AB - It is a common view that the axioms of probability can be derived from the following assumptions: (a) probabilities reflect (rational) degrees of belief, (b) degrees of belief can be measured as betting quotients; and (c) a rational agent must select betting quotients that are coherent. In this paper, I argue that a consideration of reasonable betting behaviour, with respect to the alleged derivation of the first axiom of probability, suggests that (b) and (c) are incorrect. In particular, I show how a rational agent might assign a ‘probability’ of zero to an event which she is sure will occur.

KW - Dutch Book

KW - coherence

KW - degree of belief

KW - probabolistic theories of rationality

KW - subjective interpretation of probability

UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/2080

U2 - 10.1007/s11225-007-9077-2

DO - 10.1007/s11225-007-9077-2

M3 - Journal Article (refereed)

VL - 87

SP - 65

EP - 71

JO - Studia Logica

JF - Studia Logica

SN - 0039-3215

IS - 1

ER -