Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 65-71 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | Studia Logica |
| Volume | 87 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Oct 2007 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Fingerprint
Bibliographical note
The same paper is presented at the 2006 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom, July 2006.Keywords
- Dutch Book
- coherence
- degree of belief
- probabolistic theories of rationality
- subjective interpretation of probability
Cite this
}
The insufficiency of the Dutch Book argument. / ROWBOTTOM, Darrell Patrick.
In: Studia Logica, Vol. 87, No. 1, 01.10.2007, p. 65-71.Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › Research › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - The insufficiency of the Dutch Book argument
AU - ROWBOTTOM, Darrell Patrick
N1 - The same paper is presented at the 2006 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom, July 2006.
PY - 2007/10/1
Y1 - 2007/10/1
N2 - It is a common view that the axioms of probability can be derived from the following assumptions: (a) probabilities reflect (rational) degrees of belief, (b) degrees of belief can be measured as betting quotients; and (c) a rational agent must select betting quotients that are coherent. In this paper, I argue that a consideration of reasonable betting behaviour, with respect to the alleged derivation of the first axiom of probability, suggests that (b) and (c) are incorrect. In particular, I show how a rational agent might assign a ‘probability’ of zero to an event which she is sure will occur.
AB - It is a common view that the axioms of probability can be derived from the following assumptions: (a) probabilities reflect (rational) degrees of belief, (b) degrees of belief can be measured as betting quotients; and (c) a rational agent must select betting quotients that are coherent. In this paper, I argue that a consideration of reasonable betting behaviour, with respect to the alleged derivation of the first axiom of probability, suggests that (b) and (c) are incorrect. In particular, I show how a rational agent might assign a ‘probability’ of zero to an event which she is sure will occur.
KW - Dutch Book
KW - coherence
KW - degree of belief
KW - probabolistic theories of rationality
KW - subjective interpretation of probability
UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/2080
U2 - 10.1007/s11225-007-9077-2
DO - 10.1007/s11225-007-9077-2
M3 - Journal Article (refereed)
VL - 87
SP - 65
EP - 71
JO - Studia Logica
JF - Studia Logica
SN - 0039-3215
IS - 1
ER -