Abstract
In this article, I demonstrate two ways in which our major theories of the evolution of cooperation may fail to capture particular social phenomena. The first shortcoming of our current major theories stems from the possibility of mischaracterizing the cooperative problem in game theory. The second shortcoming of our current major theories is the insensitivity of these explanatory models to ecological and genomic context. As a case study to illustrate these points, I will use the cooperative interaction of a species of myxobacteria called Myxococcus xanthus. M. xanthus cooperate in many areas of their life cycle—in quorum sensing, social motility, fruiting body formation, and predation. I focus in particular on predation as we have not yet discovered an adequate explanation of how they sustain cooperative predation in the face of developmental cheats. In explaining why we have not, I draw generalizable conclusions that shed light on our use of simplified models to explain real-world behaviors in a variety of organisms.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 25-40 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Biological Theory |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 12 Nov 2024 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Mar 2025 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© The Author(s) 2024.
Funding
This paper is part of a project that has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 101018523).
Keywords
- Cooperation
- Microbiology
- Myxobacteria
- Myxococcus xanthus
- Predation
- Public Goods game