The North’s intellectual property rights standard for the South?

Edwin L.-C. LAI, Larry D. QIU

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

70 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We build a multi-sectoral North–South trade model to analyze international intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. By comparing the Nash equilibrium IPR protection standard of the South (the developing countries) with that of the North (the developed countries), we find that the former is naturally weaker than the latter. Moreover, we show that both regions can gain from an agreement that requires the South to harmonize its IPR standards with those of the North, and the North to liberalize its traditional goods market. This demonstrates the merits of multi-sectoral negotiations in the GATT/WTO.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)183-209
Number of pages27
JournalJournal of International Economics
Volume59
Issue number1
Early online date7 Dec 2002
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2003
Externally publishedYes

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Intellectual property rights
Intellectual property rights protection
Nash equilibrium
Developing countries
Developed countries

Keywords

  • Intellectual property rights
  • Multi-sector negotiation
  • TRIPS

Cite this

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The North’s intellectual property rights standard for the South? / LAI, Edwin L.-C. ; QIU, Larry D.

In: Journal of International Economics, Vol. 59, No. 1, 01.2003, p. 183-209.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

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