Abstract
We build a multi-sectoral North–South trade model to analyze international intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. By comparing the Nash equilibrium IPR protection standard of the South (the developing countries) with that of the North (the developed countries), we find that the former is naturally weaker than the latter. Moreover, we show that both regions can gain from an agreement that requires the South to harmonize its IPR standards with those of the North, and the North to liberalize its traditional goods market. This demonstrates the merits of multi-sectoral negotiations in the GATT/WTO.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 183-209 |
| Number of pages | 27 |
| Journal | Journal of International Economics |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 7 Dec 2002 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2003 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
We thank an anonymous referee and the Editor for their very helpful suggestions. We are also grateful for the helpful comments from participants in our presentations at City University of Hong Kong, Penn State University, Oregon State University, Rutgers University, Far Eastern Meeting of Econometric Society in Kobe, and the Midwest International Economics Conferences held at Purdue U. and U. of Wisconsin-Madison.Funding
The work in this paper has been supported by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong, China (Project no. CityU 1145/99H).
Keywords
- Intellectual property rights
- Multi-sector negotiation
- TRIPS