The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining : can it be good for efficiency?

Artyom SHNEYEROV, Chi Leung, Adam WONG

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

1 Scopus Citations

Abstract

We consider a private information replica of the dynamic matching and bargaining model of Mortensen and Wright (2002). We find that private information typically deters entry. But, the welfare can actually be higher under private information.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)128-131
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume112
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2011
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Private information
Matching model
Bargaining model

Keywords

  • Markets with search frictions
  • matching and bargaining
  • two-sided incomplete information

Cite this

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title = "The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining : can it be good for efficiency?",
abstract = "We consider a private information replica of the dynamic matching and bargaining model of Mortensen and Wright (2002). We find that private information typically deters entry. But, the welfare can actually be higher under private information.",
keywords = "Markets with search frictions, matching and bargaining, two-sided incomplete information",
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year = "2011",
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language = "English",
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The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining : can it be good for efficiency? / SHNEYEROV, Artyom; WONG, Chi Leung, Adam.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 112, No. 1, 01.07.2011, p. 128-131.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)Researchpeer-review

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AB - We consider a private information replica of the dynamic matching and bargaining model of Mortensen and Wright (2002). We find that private information typically deters entry. But, the welfare can actually be higher under private information.

KW - Markets with search frictions

KW - matching and bargaining

KW - two-sided incomplete information

UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/4491

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.016

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M3 - Journal Article (refereed)

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