The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining : can it be good for efficiency?

Artyom SHNEYEROV; Chi Leung, Adam WONG

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.016

The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining : can it be good for efficiency?

Artyom SHNEYEROV, Chi Leung, Adam WONG

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a private information replica of the dynamic matching and bargaining model of Mortensen and Wright (2002). We find that private information typically deters entry. But, the welfare can actually be higher under private information.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	128-131
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	112
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.016
Publication status	Published - 1 Jul 2011
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Markets with search frictions
matching and bargaining
two-sided incomplete information

Access to Document

10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.016

Cite this

@article{64b38986b1f34724bcb68666787ab463,

title = "The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining : can it be good for efficiency?",

abstract = "We consider a private information replica of the dynamic matching and bargaining model of Mortensen and Wright (2002). We find that private information typically deters entry. But, the welfare can actually be higher under private information.",

keywords = "Markets with search frictions, matching and bargaining, two-sided incomplete information",

author = "Artyom SHNEYEROV and WONG, {Chi Leung, Adam}",

year = "2011",

month = jul,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.016",

language = "English",

volume = "112",

pages = "128--131",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",