I provide a simple solution to the problem of determining the characterising feature(s) of the simple approach to personal identity, sometimes also called the simple view: instead of focusing on claims regarding the analysability, reducibility, or triviality of the concepts used in simple theories of personal identity, I propose instead a metaphysical criterion to define this approach. In particular, I claim that the simple approach is (best seen as) that family of theories according to which personal identity is a relation that essentially depends on a mereologically simple (or impartite) entity the existence and features of which may be known directly (e.g., by introspection) or indirectly (e.g., by deduction from a series of other premises).
|Title of host publication||Pisa Colloquium in Logic, Language and Epistemology|
|Subtitle of host publication||Essays in Honour of Mauro Mariani and Carlo Marletti|
|Editors||Luca Bellotti, Luca Gili, Enrico Moriconi, Giacomo Turbanti|
|Publication status||Published - May 2019|
- Personal identity
- simple view
- mereological simplicity