The value of multilateral trade liberalization and the need for third-party sanction

Kong-Pin CHEN; Cheng Zhong QIN; Larry D. QIU

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17134-5_4

The value of multilateral trade liberalization and the need for third-party sanction

Kong-Pin CHEN, Cheng Zhong QIN, Larry D. QIU

Research output: Book Chapters | Papers in Conference Proceedings › Book Chapter › Research

Abstract

The GATT/WTO and preferential trade agreements help member countries to achieve further gains from trade by promoting deeper trade liberalization. In general, free trade does not automatically follow from individualistic behavior. A major reason for this has to do with the existence of monopolistic power in trade.1 Trade liberalization requires that countries behave cooperatively and reciprocally. In certain circumstances, greater cooperation and reciprocity can only be achieved through multilateral trade agreements, as opposed to a web of bilateral trade agreements,2 and sustained through third-party punishments.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	International economic policies in a globalized world
Editors	Seiichi KATAYAMA, Heinrich W. URSPRUNG
Place of Publication	Berlin
Publisher	Springer
Pages	55-65
Number of pages	11
Edition	1
ISBN (Electronic)	9783642620720
ISBN (Print)	9783642171345
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17134-5_4
Publication status	Published - 2004
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

We benefitted from comments by Stephen Ching and participants at the International Conference on Greater China and the WTO, held in March 2001 in Hong Kong. Financial support from Hong Kong SAR Government (HKUST6214100H) is greatly acknowledged.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium
Trade Policy
Trade Liberalization
Consumer Surplus
Pareto Improvement

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-642-17134-5_4

Cite this

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title = "The value of multilateral trade liberalization and the need for third-party sanction",

abstract = "The GATT/WTO and preferential trade agreements help member countries to achieve further gains from trade by promoting deeper trade liberalization. In general, free trade does not automatically follow from individualistic behavior. A major reason for this has to do with the existence of monopolistic power in trade.1 Trade liberalization requires that countries behave cooperatively and reciprocally. In certain circumstances, greater cooperation and reciprocity can only be achieved through multilateral trade agreements, as opposed to a web of bilateral trade agreements,2 and sustained through third-party punishments.",

keywords = "Nash Equilibrium, Trade Policy, Trade Liberalization, Consumer Surplus, Pareto Improvement",

author = "Kong-Pin CHEN and QIN, {Cheng Zhong} and QIU, {Larry D.}",

note = "We benefitted from comments by Stephen Ching and participants at the International Conference on Greater China and the WTO, held in March 2001 in Hong Kong. Financial support from Hong Kong SAR Government (HKUST6214100H) is greatly acknowledged.",

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The value of multilateral trade liberalization and the need for third-party sanction. / CHEN, Kong-Pin; QIN, Cheng Zhong; QIU, Larry D.
International economic policies in a globalized world. ed. / Seiichi KATAYAMA; Heinrich W. URSPRUNG. 1. ed. Berlin: Springer, 2004. p. 55-65.

Research output: Book Chapters | Papers in Conference Proceedings › Book Chapter › Research

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AU - QIU, Larry D.

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PY - 2004

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N2 - The GATT/WTO and preferential trade agreements help member countries to achieve further gains from trade by promoting deeper trade liberalization. In general, free trade does not automatically follow from individualistic behavior. A major reason for this has to do with the existence of monopolistic power in trade.1 Trade liberalization requires that countries behave cooperatively and reciprocally. In certain circumstances, greater cooperation and reciprocity can only be achieved through multilateral trade agreements, as opposed to a web of bilateral trade agreements,2 and sustained through third-party punishments.

AB - The GATT/WTO and preferential trade agreements help member countries to achieve further gains from trade by promoting deeper trade liberalization. In general, free trade does not automatically follow from individualistic behavior. A major reason for this has to do with the existence of monopolistic power in trade.1 Trade liberalization requires that countries behave cooperatively and reciprocally. In certain circumstances, greater cooperation and reciprocity can only be achieved through multilateral trade agreements, as opposed to a web of bilateral trade agreements,2 and sustained through third-party punishments.

KW - Nash Equilibrium

KW - Trade Policy

KW - Trade Liberalization

KW - Consumer Surplus

KW - Pareto Improvement

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BT - International economic policies in a globalized world

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ER -

The value of multilateral trade liberalization and the need for third-party sanction

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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