Abstract
We are typically near-future biased, prioritising our present and near-future interests over our own distant-future interests. This bias can be directed at others as well, prioritising their present and near-future interests over their distant-future interests. I argue that, given these biases, and given a plausible limit on the extent to which we can permissibly prioritise our present interests over the present interests of strangers, we are morally required to prioritise the present interests of strangers over our distant-future interests. I also argue that a similar conclusion holds even if we are near biased only towards ourselves, and regardless of whether this bias is rational. And I show that my conclusions have interesting implications for the ethics of charitable giving, because they generate moral pressure to donate to charity those funds that would otherwise have gone into our long-term savings.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 373-396 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | Mind |
| Volume | 134 |
| Issue number | 534 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 2025 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
I owe a special thanks to Joe Horton for invaluable feedback on multiple drafts, as well as Andreas Mogensen, Luca Stroppa, and Teru Thomas for helpful written comments on earlier versions of the paper. I also thank the Editors and two anonymous reviewers for MIND, whose suggestions vastly improved the paper. For insightful comments and conversations, I thank Kacper Kowalczyk, Harry Lloyd, Brian McElwee, Christian Tarsney, Theron Pummer, Patrick Tomlin, Nikhil Venkatesh, the participants of the 2022 Early Careers Conference Programme (Global Priorities Institute, University of Oxford), and the audiences of the BSET Annual Conference (Reading), 12 Workshop on Global Priorities Research (Oxford), 5 CEPPA Graduate Conference (St Andrews), Open Minds Graduate Conference (Manchester), and the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics.Publisher Copyright:
© SUNG 2025.
Funding
This research was generously supported by the Society for Applied Philosophy, the Royal Institute of Philosophy, and the Forethought Foundation for Global Priorities Research.