Transfer pricing in a multidivisional firm : a cooperative game analysis

Mingming LENG, Mahmut PARLAR

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the transfer pricing decision for a multidivisional firm with an upstream division and multiple downstream divisions. The downstream divisions can independently determine their retail prices, and decide on whether or not they will purchase from the upstream division at negotiated transfer prices. To allocate the firm-wide profit between upstream and downstream divisions, we construct a cooperative game, show the convexity of the game, and then compute the Shapley value-based transfer prices for the firm.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)364-369
Number of pages6
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume40
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2012

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Keywords

  • Transfer price; Cooperative game theory; The core; Shapley value

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