Triviality Results for Probabilistic Modals

Simon David GOLDSTEIN

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

Abstract

In recent years, a number of theorists have claimed that beliefs about probability are transparent. To believe probably p is simply to have a high credence that p. In this paper, I prove a variety of triviality results for theses like the above. I show that such claims are inconsistent with the thesis that probabilistic modal sentences have propositions or sets of worlds as their meaning. Then I consider the extent to which a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals can capture theses connecting belief, certainty, credence, and probability. I show that although a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals does allow one to validate such theses, it can only do so at a cost. I prove that such theses can only be valid if probabilistic modals do not satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)188-222
Number of pages35
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume99
Issue number1
Early online date12 Dec 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2019

Fingerprint

Costs
Axioms

Cite this

GOLDSTEIN, Simon David. / Triviality Results for Probabilistic Modals. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2019 ; Vol. 99, No. 1. pp. 188-222.
@article{71ce68f56bed4a65a105c6975558e331,
title = "Triviality Results for Probabilistic Modals",
abstract = "In recent years, a number of theorists have claimed that beliefs about probability are transparent. To believe probably p is simply to have a high credence that p. In this paper, I prove a variety of triviality results for theses like the above. I show that such claims are inconsistent with the thesis that probabilistic modal sentences have propositions or sets of worlds as their meaning. Then I consider the extent to which a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals can capture theses connecting belief, certainty, credence, and probability. I show that although a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals does allow one to validate such theses, it can only do so at a cost. I prove that such theses can only be valid if probabilistic modals do not satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus.",
author = "GOLDSTEIN, {Simon David}",
year = "2019",
month = "7",
doi = "10.1111/phpr.12477",
language = "English",
volume = "99",
pages = "188--222",
journal = "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research",
issn = "0031-8205",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

Triviality Results for Probabilistic Modals. / GOLDSTEIN, Simon David.

In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 99, No. 1, 07.2019, p. 188-222.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

TY - JOUR

T1 - Triviality Results for Probabilistic Modals

AU - GOLDSTEIN, Simon David

PY - 2019/7

Y1 - 2019/7

N2 - In recent years, a number of theorists have claimed that beliefs about probability are transparent. To believe probably p is simply to have a high credence that p. In this paper, I prove a variety of triviality results for theses like the above. I show that such claims are inconsistent with the thesis that probabilistic modal sentences have propositions or sets of worlds as their meaning. Then I consider the extent to which a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals can capture theses connecting belief, certainty, credence, and probability. I show that although a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals does allow one to validate such theses, it can only do so at a cost. I prove that such theses can only be valid if probabilistic modals do not satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus.

AB - In recent years, a number of theorists have claimed that beliefs about probability are transparent. To believe probably p is simply to have a high credence that p. In this paper, I prove a variety of triviality results for theses like the above. I show that such claims are inconsistent with the thesis that probabilistic modal sentences have propositions or sets of worlds as their meaning. Then I consider the extent to which a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals can capture theses connecting belief, certainty, credence, and probability. I show that although a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals does allow one to validate such theses, it can only do so at a cost. I prove that such theses can only be valid if probabilistic modals do not satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85068971299&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/phpr.12477

DO - 10.1111/phpr.12477

M3 - Journal Article (refereed)

VL - 99

SP - 188

EP - 222

JO - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

JF - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

SN - 0031-8205

IS - 1

ER -