Truth, topicality, and transparency: one-component versus two-component semantics

Peter HAWKE, Levin HORNISCHER, Francesco BERTO*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

Abstract

When do two sentences say the same thing, that is, express the same content? We defend two-component (2C) semantics: the view that propositional contents comprise (at least) two irreducibly distinct constituents: (1) truth-conditions and (2) subject-matter. We contrast 2C with one-component (1C) semantics, focusing on the view that subject-matter is reducible to truth-conditions. We identify exponents of this view and argue in favor of 2C. An appendix proposes a general formal template for propositional 2C semantics.
Original languageEnglish
JournalLinguistics and Philosophy
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 31 May 2024

Bibliographical note

Variations on the ideas included in this paper were presented at the Exploring Hyperintensional Semantics workshop (November 2018) at Utrecht University; during the Chair Mercier Lectures at the Université Catholique de Louvain; at the 9th Summer School in Philosophy at the University of Hamburg; to the MUMBLE Research Group, Department of Philosophy, University of Turin; to the Metaphysics and Logic Group at Arché in St Andrews; and to the Lingnan Faculty Research Seminar (October 2021) at Lingnan University, Hong Kong.

Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2024.

Keywords

  • 2-Component semantics
  • Aboutness
  • Subject matter
  • Topicality
  • Truth conditions

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