Two-stage advertisement recommendation service regulation based on a tripartite game model

Chi ZHOU; Yiqing LI; Mingsen CHU; Xinxin MI; Zhiyuan LUO

doi:10.1109/ICSSSM.2019.8887851

Two-stage advertisement recommendation service regulation based on a tripartite game model

Chi ZHOU
, Yiqing LI
, Mingsen CHU^*
, Xinxin MI
, Zhiyuan LUO

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Book Chapters | Papers in Conference Proceedings › Conference paper (refereed) › Research › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Advertisement recommendation service provides consumers with relevant product information and plays a guiding role when consumers search and buy products. However, some misleading advertisements are recommended to consumers for purpose of stimulating their purchasing desire. This paper investigates a problem in the field of two-stage advertisement recommendation service regulation, and a tripartite game model is established to analyze the relationship among the government, the rent-seeking platform, and the misleading advertiser. In addition, we explore the government supervision strategies and examine the effects of the penalty on the probability of publishing misleading advertisements. Then we further discuss how supervision costs and speculation profits impact the probably of supervision and rent-seeking separately. Moreover, numerical examples are given to validate the correctness of the conclusion. Finally, the article proposes some related suggestions for improving advertisement recommendation service regulation, thus offer feasible countermeasures to current government supervisory policy.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Proceedings of 16th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management, ICSSSM 2019
Publisher	IEEE
Number of pages	5
ISBN (Electronic)	9781728119410
ISBN (Print)	9781728119427
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSSSM.2019.8887851
Publication status	Published - Jul 2019
Externally published	Yes
Event	16th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management, ICSSSM 2019 - Shenzhen, China Duration: 13 Jul 2019 → 15 Jul 2019

Conference

Conference	16th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management, ICSSSM 2019
Country/Territory	China
City	Shenzhen
Period	13/07/19 → 15/07/19

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 IEEE.

Funding

This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71702129), Tianjin Municipal Science and Technology Project (18ZLZXZF00380), Humanity and Social Science Youth Foundation of Ministry of Education of China (No. 17YJC630232), and China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (No. 2017M610160).

Keywords

Advertisement recommendation service
Regulation
Rent-seeking
Tripartite game

Access to Document

10.1109/ICSSSM.2019.8887851

Cite this

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title = "Two-stage advertisement recommendation service regulation based on a tripartite game model",

abstract = "Advertisement recommendation service provides consumers with relevant product information and plays a guiding role when consumers search and buy products. However, some misleading advertisements are recommended to consumers for purpose of stimulating their purchasing desire. This paper investigates a problem in the field of two-stage advertisement recommendation service regulation, and a tripartite game model is established to analyze the relationship among the government, the rent-seeking platform, and the misleading advertiser. In addition, we explore the government supervision strategies and examine the effects of the penalty on the probability of publishing misleading advertisements. Then we further discuss how supervision costs and speculation profits impact the probably of supervision and rent-seeking separately. Moreover, numerical examples are given to validate the correctness of the conclusion. Finally, the article proposes some related suggestions for improving advertisement recommendation service regulation, thus offer feasible countermeasures to current government supervisory policy.",

keywords = "Advertisement recommendation service, Regulation, Rent-seeking, Tripartite game",

author = "Chi ZHOU and Yiqing LI and Mingsen CHU and Xinxin MI and Zhiyuan LUO",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019 IEEE.; 16th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management, ICSSSM 2019 ; Conference date: 13-07-2019 Through 15-07-2019",

year = "2019",

month = jul,

doi = "10.1109/ICSSSM.2019.8887851",

language = "English",

isbn = "9781728119427",

booktitle = "Proceedings of 16th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management, ICSSSM 2019",

publisher = "IEEE",

}

ZHOU, C, LI, Y, CHU, M, MI, X & LUO, Z 2019, Two-stage advertisement recommendation service regulation based on a tripartite game model. in Proceedings of 16th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management, ICSSSM 2019., 8887851, IEEE, 16th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management, ICSSSM 2019, Shenzhen, China, 13/07/19. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSSSM.2019.8887851

Two-stage advertisement recommendation service regulation based on a tripartite game model. / ZHOU, Chi; LI, Yiqing; CHU, Mingsen et al.
Proceedings of 16th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management, ICSSSM 2019. IEEE, 2019. 8887851.

Research output: Book Chapters | Papers in Conference Proceedings › Conference paper (refereed) › Research › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Two-stage advertisement recommendation service regulation based on a tripartite game model

AU - ZHOU, Chi

AU - LI, Yiqing

AU - CHU, Mingsen

AU - MI, Xinxin

AU - LUO, Zhiyuan

PY - 2019/7

Y1 - 2019/7

N2 - Advertisement recommendation service provides consumers with relevant product information and plays a guiding role when consumers search and buy products. However, some misleading advertisements are recommended to consumers for purpose of stimulating their purchasing desire. This paper investigates a problem in the field of two-stage advertisement recommendation service regulation, and a tripartite game model is established to analyze the relationship among the government, the rent-seeking platform, and the misleading advertiser. In addition, we explore the government supervision strategies and examine the effects of the penalty on the probability of publishing misleading advertisements. Then we further discuss how supervision costs and speculation profits impact the probably of supervision and rent-seeking separately. Moreover, numerical examples are given to validate the correctness of the conclusion. Finally, the article proposes some related suggestions for improving advertisement recommendation service regulation, thus offer feasible countermeasures to current government supervisory policy.

AB - Advertisement recommendation service provides consumers with relevant product information and plays a guiding role when consumers search and buy products. However, some misleading advertisements are recommended to consumers for purpose of stimulating their purchasing desire. This paper investigates a problem in the field of two-stage advertisement recommendation service regulation, and a tripartite game model is established to analyze the relationship among the government, the rent-seeking platform, and the misleading advertiser. In addition, we explore the government supervision strategies and examine the effects of the penalty on the probability of publishing misleading advertisements. Then we further discuss how supervision costs and speculation profits impact the probably of supervision and rent-seeking separately. Moreover, numerical examples are given to validate the correctness of the conclusion. Finally, the article proposes some related suggestions for improving advertisement recommendation service regulation, thus offer feasible countermeasures to current government supervisory policy.

KW - Advertisement recommendation service

KW - Regulation

KW - Rent-seeking

KW - Tripartite game

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DO - 10.1109/ICSSSM.2019.8887851

M3 - Conference paper (refereed)

AN - SCOPUS:85074878734

SN - 9781728119427

BT - Proceedings of 16th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management, ICSSSM 2019

PB - IEEE

T2 - 16th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management, ICSSSM 2019

Y2 - 13 July 2019 through 15 July 2019

ER -

Two-stage advertisement recommendation service regulation based on a tripartite game model

Abstract

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Keywords

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