Vertical research joint ventures

Samiran BANERJEE, Ping LIN

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

60 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine the incentives of firms to form vertical research joint ventures (RJVs) which enable an upstream supplier to internalize the positive externality of its innovation on a downstream market, while giving the downstream members a cost advantage over their non-member rivals. Under the cost-sharing rules considered, the upstream member desires a larger RJV compared to the downstream members. RandD subsidies may be detrimental to social welfare. The optimal RJV size for the upstream (downstream) member decreases (increases) with RandD cost and increases (decreases) with the gains from innovation and the size of market. An increase in upstream competition has the effect of enlarging the optimal RJV.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)285-302
Number of pages18
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume19
Issue number1-2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2001

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Innovation
Costs
Research joint ventures
RandD
Social welfare
Sharing rule
Positive externalities
Incentives
Suppliers
Cost sharing
Subsidies

Cite this

BANERJEE, Samiran ; LIN, Ping. / Vertical research joint ventures. In: International Journal of Industrial Organization. 2001 ; Vol. 19, No. 1-2. pp. 285-302.
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Vertical research joint ventures. / BANERJEE, Samiran; LIN, Ping.

In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1-2, 01.01.2001, p. 285-302.

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

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