Volume Incentive Through Performance-based Allocation of Business

Research output: Other Conference ContributionsPresentation

Abstract

Buyers want their suppliers to make efforts to improve performance in the delivery of products and services, but the effort is costly and often unobservable to the buyers. A common practice for inducing high-level supplier performance is to source from multiple suppliers and strategically allocate business based on their past performance. To investigate the design of such performance-based volume incentive schemes, we consider a buyer’s dual sourcing problem in a dynamic principal-agent setting. We find that, to maximize suppliers’ competition over time, the optimal allocation scheme should involve the suppliers’ current shares of business and is generally not a simple rankorder tournament or winner-take-all allocation. The optimal scheme allocates business according to each supplier’s performance relative to their respective optimal performance target, and may not reward the better performer a larger share. A simple way to achieve near-optimal results is the use of "handicapped rules" that can significantly outperform simple first-past-the-post rules.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 15 Jul 2015
Event27th European Conference on Operational Research - University of Strathclyde, Scotland, United Kingdom
Duration: 12 Jul 201515 Jul 2015
https://euro2015.euro-online.org/programme.html

Conference

Conference27th European Conference on Operational Research
CountryUnited Kingdom
CityScotland
Period12/07/1515/07/15
Internet address

Fingerprint

Incentives
Suppliers
Buyers
Supplier performance
Tournament
Optimal allocation
Incentive schemes
Winner-take-all
Reward
Dual sourcing

Keywords

  • Supply Chain Management

Cite this

LIANG, L. (2015). Volume Incentive Through Performance-based Allocation of Business. 27th European Conference on Operational Research, Scotland, United Kingdom.
LIANG, Liping. / Volume Incentive Through Performance-based Allocation of Business. 27th European Conference on Operational Research, Scotland, United Kingdom.
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LIANG, L 2015, 'Volume Incentive Through Performance-based Allocation of Business', 27th European Conference on Operational Research, Scotland, United Kingdom, 12/07/15 - 15/07/15.

Volume Incentive Through Performance-based Allocation of Business. / LIANG, Liping.

2015. 27th European Conference on Operational Research, Scotland, United Kingdom.

Research output: Other Conference ContributionsPresentation

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AB - Buyers want their suppliers to make efforts to improve performance in the delivery of products and services, but the effort is costly and often unobservable to the buyers. A common practice for inducing high-level supplier performance is to source from multiple suppliers and strategically allocate business based on their past performance. To investigate the design of such performance-based volume incentive schemes, we consider a buyer’s dual sourcing problem in a dynamic principal-agent setting. We find that, to maximize suppliers’ competition over time, the optimal allocation scheme should involve the suppliers’ current shares of business and is generally not a simple rankorder tournament or winner-take-all allocation. The optimal scheme allocates business according to each supplier’s performance relative to their respective optimal performance target, and may not reward the better performer a larger share. A simple way to achieve near-optimal results is the use of "handicapped rules" that can significantly outperform simple first-past-the-post rules.

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M3 - Presentation

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LIANG L. Volume Incentive Through Performance-based Allocation of Business. 2015. 27th European Conference on Operational Research, Scotland, United Kingdom.