Abstract
We investigate wage-hours contracts within a four-period rent sharing model that incorporates asymmetric information. Distinctions are made among (a) an investment period, (b) a period in which the parties may separate (quits or layoffs) or continue rent accumulation and sharing, (c) a post investment period and, (d) retirement. We establish that increases in both wage rates and hours of work in the post-investment period serve to minimise sub-optimal separations and, moreover that both wage and hours schedules are concave. Testing is based on 13 waves of British Household Panel Survey from 1991 to 2003.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Labormetrics |
| Editors | Lutz BELLMANN, Wolfgang FRANZ, Knut GERLACH, Reinhard HUJER, Wolfgang MEYER, Joachim WAGNER |
| Publisher | De Gruyter |
| Pages | 446-464 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9783110511680 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9783110499452 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Nov 2016 |
Bibliographical note
Originally published in Jahrbücher f. Nationalökonomie u. Statistik (Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart 2008) Bd. (Vol.) 228/5+6.Publisher Copyright: © Lucius & Lucius Verlagsgesellschaft mbH Stuttgart 2008. All rights reserved.
Funding
This project was funded by the Nuffield Foundation under the Social Science Small Grants Scheme.