Abstract
We investigate wage-hours contracts within a four-period rent sharing model that incorporates asymmetric information. Distinctions are made among (a) an investment period, (b) a period in which the parties may separate (quits or layoffs) or continue rent accumulation and sharing, (c) a post investment period and, (d) retirement. We establish that increases in both wage rates and hours of work in the post-investment period serve to minimise sub-optimal separations and, moreover that both wage and hours schedules are concave. Testing is based on 13 waves of British Household Panel Survey from 1991 to 2003.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Labormetrics |
| Editors | Lutz BELLMANN, Wolfgang FRANZ, Knut GERLACH, Reinhard HUJER, Wolfgang MEYER, Joachim WAGNER |
| Publisher | De Gruyter |
| Pages | 446-464 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9783110511680 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9783110499452 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Nov 2016 |
Bibliographical note
Originally published in Jahrbücher f. Nationalökonomie u. Statistik (Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart 2008) Bd. (Vol.) 228/5+6.Publisher Copyright: © Lucius & Lucius Verlagsgesellschaft mbH Stuttgart 2008. All rights reserved.
Funding
This project was funded by the Nuffield Foundation under the Social Science Small Grants Scheme.
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth
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