Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1186-1220 |
| Number of pages | 35 |
| Journal | Comparative Political Studies |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue number | 9 |
| Early online date | 10 Oct 2016 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Aug 2017 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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Keywords
- China
- anticorruption
- authoritarian politics
- elite competition
- patronage
Cite this
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Weapons of the powerful : authoritarian elite competition and politicized anticorruption in China. / ZHU, Jiangnan; ZHANG, Dong.
In: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 50, No. 9, 01.08.2017, p. 1186-1220.Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed)
TY - JOUR
T1 - Weapons of the powerful : authoritarian elite competition and politicized anticorruption in China
AU - ZHU, Jiangnan
AU - ZHANG, Dong
PY - 2017/8/1
Y1 - 2017/8/1
N2 - What motivates authoritarian regimes to crack down on corruption? We argue that just as partisan competition in democracies tends to politicize corruption, authoritarian leaders may exploit anticorruption campaigns to target rivals’ power networks during internal power struggles for consolidating their power base. We apply this theoretical framework to provincial leadership turnover in China and test it using an anticorruption data set. We find that intraelite power competition, captured by the informal power configuration of government incumbents and their predecessors, can increase investigations of corrupt senior officials by up to 20%. The intensity of anticorruption propaganda exhibits a similar pattern. The findings indicate that informal politics can propel strong anticorruption drives in countries without democratically accountable institutions, although these drives tend to be selective, arbitrary, and factionally biased.
AB - What motivates authoritarian regimes to crack down on corruption? We argue that just as partisan competition in democracies tends to politicize corruption, authoritarian leaders may exploit anticorruption campaigns to target rivals’ power networks during internal power struggles for consolidating their power base. We apply this theoretical framework to provincial leadership turnover in China and test it using an anticorruption data set. We find that intraelite power competition, captured by the informal power configuration of government incumbents and their predecessors, can increase investigations of corrupt senior officials by up to 20%. The intensity of anticorruption propaganda exhibits a similar pattern. The findings indicate that informal politics can propel strong anticorruption drives in countries without democratically accountable institutions, although these drives tend to be selective, arbitrary, and factionally biased.
KW - China
KW - anticorruption
KW - authoritarian politics
KW - elite competition
KW - patronage
UR - http://commons.ln.edu.hk/sw_master/5959
UR - https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85021746476&doi=10.1177%2f0010414016672234&partnerID=40&md5=30d0a104c7521872aafa0024b7583d79
U2 - 10.1177/0010414016672234
DO - 10.1177/0010414016672234
M3 - Journal Article (refereed)
VL - 50
SP - 1186
EP - 1220
JO - Comparative Political Studies
JF - Comparative Political Studies
SN - 0010-4140
IS - 9
ER -