In this paper, I defend teleological theories of belief against the exclusivity objection. I argue that despite the exclusive influence of truth in doxastic deliberation, multiple epistemic aims interact when we consider what to believe. This is apparent when we focus on the processes involved in specific instances (or concrete cases) of doxastic deliberation, such that the propositions under consideration are specified. First, I outline a general schema for weighing aims. Second, I discuss recent attempts to defend the teleological position in relation to this schema. And third, I develop and defend my proposal that multiple epistemic aims interact in doxastic deliberation—a possibility which, as of yet, has received no serious attention in the literature.
Bibliographical noteI’d like to thank my Ph.D. supervisors, Darrell Rowbottom and Jenny Nado, for their guidance during the Ph.D. process. It is due to their many helpful comments on drafts of my thesis that I have been able to write this paper. I’d also like to thank Andrea Sauchelli, Derek Baker, and Tinghao Wang for their detailed comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and an audience at the 2018 Frontiers of Epistemology conference at Yonsei University, Seoul, for their helpful feedback. And finally, I’d like to thank two anonymous referees for this journal, whose comments helped me to clarify a number of important points.
- Aim of belief
- Doxastic deliberation