Welfare retrenchment under left and right government leadership : towards a consolidated framework of analysis?

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2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This chapter aims to add to the literature on welfare retrenchment by consolidating prospect theoretical, party competition and veto player explanations into one framework of analysis. It tests this framework against comparative historical evidence of four Western European democracies, namely Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands. It suggests answers to the questions ‘why’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ policymakers engage in welfare retrenchment are indeed best considered jointly: looking at the ‘why’ question through ‘losses domains’ enables us to identify governments that are more likely to engage in “treacherous” welfare retrenchment, but falls short of telling us much about possible stumbling blocks to reform in political systems with multiple constitutional constraints. Considering party competition and particularly the strength of Left parties helps us to understand ‘when’ policymakers are likely to engage in unpopular welfare retrenchment, but fails to illuminate ‘how’ – or the mechanisms through which – welfare retrenchments are achieved, namely consensus seeking.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSocial policy review, 24 : Analysis and debate in social policy, 2012
PublisherPolicy Press
Pages137-163
Number of pages27
ISBN (Print)9781447304470
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2012
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

welfare
leadership
Denmark
political system
Netherlands
France
democracy
reform
evidence

Keywords

  • Blame avoidance
  • Partisan competition
  • Prospect theory
  • Veto players
  • Welfare retrenchment

Cite this

KÜHNER, Stefan. / Welfare retrenchment under left and right government leadership : towards a consolidated framework of analysis?. Social policy review, 24 : Analysis and debate in social policy, 2012. Policy Press, 2012. pp. 137-163
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Welfare retrenchment under left and right government leadership : towards a consolidated framework of analysis? / KÜHNER, Stefan.

Social policy review, 24 : Analysis and debate in social policy, 2012. Policy Press, 2012. p. 137-163.

Research output: Book Chapters | Papers in Conference ProceedingsBook ChapterResearchpeer-review

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