I argue that the central conflict between epistemic and ontic versions of structural realism concerns whether it is possible to read off ontology from current fundamental science. After taking a quick look at two arguments from the philosophy of modern physics challenging the ontic version, I assume that the ontic version is not vulnerable to these criticisms. However, even if we assume that structures are metaphysically superior to objects, that still does not say anything about the possibility of reading off ontology from current fundamental science. After I write down premises and conclusions of the arguments of ontic and epistemic versions, I show that the conclusion as regards to the possibility of reading off ontology from current science in the ontic version is already assumed in one of the premises; hence the argument begs the question. As a result, the problem of ontological discontinuity throughout radical theory changes in the history of science implied in the pessimistic meta-induction argument remains intact in ontic structural realism.
|Publication status||Published - 15 Nov 2018|
|Event||IX Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science - Edificio de Humanidades UNED, Madrid, Spain|
Duration: 13 Nov 2018 → 16 Nov 2018
|Conference||IX Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science|
|Period||13/11/18 → 16/11/18|
AKCIN, H. (2018). What is Really Wrong with Ontic Structural Realism? On the Possibility of Reading off Ontology from Current Fundamental Science. IX Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Madrid, Spain.