What is Really Wrong with Ontic Structural Realism? On the Possibility of Reading off Ontology from Current Fundamental Science

Haktan AKCIN

Research output: Other Conference ContributionsPresentationPresentation

Abstract

I argue that the central conflict between epistemic and ontic versions of structural realism concerns whether it is possible to read off ontology from current fundamental science. After taking a quick look at two arguments from the philosophy of modern physics challenging the ontic version, I assume that the ontic version is not vulnerable to these criticisms. However, even if we assume that structures are metaphysically superior to objects, that still does not say anything about the possibility of reading off ontology from current fundamental science. After I write down premises and conclusions of the arguments of ontic and epistemic versions, I show that the conclusion as regards to the possibility of reading off ontology from current science in the ontic version is already assumed in one of the premises; hence the argument begs the question. As a result, the problem of ontological discontinuity throughout radical theory changes in the history of science implied in the pessimistic meta-induction argument remains intact in ontic structural realism.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 15 Nov 2018
EventIX Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science - Edificio de Humanidades UNED, Madrid, Spain
Duration: 13 Nov 201816 Nov 2018
http://www.solofici.org/congreso2018/

Conference

ConferenceIX Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science
CountrySpain
CityMadrid
Period13/11/1816/11/18
Internet address

Fingerprint

Ontology
Fundamental
Ontic Structural Realism
Ontological
Structural Realism
Theory Change
Pessimistic Meta-induction
History of the Sciences
Discontinuity
Criticism
Physics
Philosophy

Cite this

AKCIN, H. (2018). What is Really Wrong with Ontic Structural Realism? On the Possibility of Reading off Ontology from Current Fundamental Science. IX Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Madrid, Spain.
AKCIN, Haktan . / What is Really Wrong with Ontic Structural Realism? On the Possibility of Reading off Ontology from Current Fundamental Science. IX Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Madrid, Spain.
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AKCIN, H 2018, 'What is Really Wrong with Ontic Structural Realism? On the Possibility of Reading off Ontology from Current Fundamental Science' IX Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Madrid, Spain, 13/11/18 - 16/11/18, .

What is Really Wrong with Ontic Structural Realism? On the Possibility of Reading off Ontology from Current Fundamental Science. / AKCIN, Haktan .

2018. IX Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Madrid, Spain.

Research output: Other Conference ContributionsPresentationPresentation

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AKCIN H. What is Really Wrong with Ontic Structural Realism? On the Possibility of Reading off Ontology from Current Fundamental Science. 2018. IX Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Madrid, Spain.