What is Really Wrong with Ontic Structural Realism? On the Possibility of Reading off Ontology from Current Fundamental Science

Haktan AKCIN*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

Abstract

I argue that the central conflict between epistemic and ontic versions of structural realism concerns whether it is possible to read off ontology from current fundamental science. Even if we assume that structures are metaphysically superior to objects, the possibility of reading off ontology from current fundamental science remains unjustified. I show that the conclusion as regards the reading off ontology in the ontic version is already assumed in one of the premises; hence the argument begs the question. As a result, the problem of ontological discontinuity implied in the pessimistic meta-induction argument remains intact in ontic structural realism.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)597-608
JournalBeytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy
Volume9
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2019

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Keywords

  • Structural realism
  • theory change in science
  • reading off ontology from science

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