Abstract
A central question in neuroscience concerns the relationship between consciousness and its physical substrate. Here, we argue that a richer characterization of consciousness can be obtained by viewing it as constituted of distinct information-theoretic elements. In other words, we propose a shift from quantification of consciousness - viewed as integrated information - to its decomposition. Through this approach, termed Integrated Information Decomposition (φID), we lay out a formal argument that whether the consciousness of a given system is an emergent phenomenon depends on its information-theoretic composition - providing a principled answer to the long-standing dispute on the relationship between consciousness and emergence. Furthermore, we show that two organisms may attain the same amount of integrated information, yet differ in their information-theoretic composition. Building on φID's revised understanding of integrated information, termed φR, we also introduce the notion of φR-ing ratio to quantify how efficiently an entity uses information for conscious processing. A combination of φR and φR-ing ratio may provide an important way to compare the neural basis of different aspects of consciousness. Decomposition of consciousness enables us to identify qualitatively different 'modes of consciousness', establishing a common space for mapping the phenomenology of different conscious states. We outline both theoretical and empirical avenues to carry out such mapping between phenomenology and information-theoretic modes, starting from a central feature of everyday consciousness: selfhood. Overall, φID yields rich new ways to explore the relationship between information, consciousness, and its emergence from neural dynamics.
Original language | English |
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Article number | niab027 |
Journal | Neuroscience of Consciousness |
Volume | 2021 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2021 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press.
Funding
This work was supported by the Gates Cambridge Trust (to A.I.L.); the Stephen Erskine Fellowship (Queens College, Cambridge, to E.A.S.); the Wellcome Trust (grant no. 210920/Z/18/Z; to P.A.M. and D.B.); The History and Philosophy of Science Trust Fund (to D.J.H.); the Ad Astra Chandaria foundation (to F.R.); and Ad Astra Trust, Tim Ferriss, The Nikean Foundation, and The Tamas Family (to R.L.C.-H.) The Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) (RCZB/072 RG93193; to E.A.S.).
Keywords
- consciousness
- information decomposition
- integrated information theory
- phenomenology
- selfhood