Why do we need a theory of implementation?

André  CURTIS-TRUDEL

doi:10.1086/714791

Why do we need a theory of implementation?

André CURTIS-TRUDEL^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Lingnan University

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

Abstract

The received view of computation is methodologically bifurcated: it offers different accounts of computation in the mathematical and physical cases. But little in the way of argument has been given for this approach. This paper rectifies the situation by arguing that the alternative, a unified account, is untenable. Furthermore, once these issues are brought into sharper relief we can see that work remains to be done to illuminate the relationship between physical and mathematical computation.

Original language	English
Number of pages	32
Journal	British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Volume	73
Issue number	4
Early online date	20 Dec 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1086/714791
Publication status	Published - Dec 2022

Bibliographical note

I would like to thank Stewart Shapiro, Richard Samuels, and Chris Pincock for invaluable feed-back and support throughout the writing of this paper. Additional thanks go to Ethan Brauer, Steven Dalglish, Preston Lennon, and Damon Stanley for helpful comments and discussion. Early versions of this paper were presented to audiences at the 2019 Ohio State Fink Ceremony and the 2019 meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy. I wish to thank the members of each audience for their questions. Finally, I wish to thank three anonymous referees whose insightful comments and suggestions significantly improved the final version.

Access to Document

10.1086/714791

Cite this

@article{31f6b77982cb4650a027fbe733dd5f8a,

title = "Why do we need a theory of implementation?",

abstract = "The received view of computation is methodologically bifurcated: it offers different accounts of computation in the mathematical and physical cases. But little in the way of argument has been given for this approach. This paper rectifies the situation by arguing that the alternative, a unified account, is untenable. Furthermore, once these issues are brought into sharper relief we can see that work remains to be done to illuminate the relationship between physical and mathematical computation.",

author = "Andr{\'e} CURTIS-TRUDEL",

note = "I would like to thank Stewart Shapiro, Richard Samuels, and Chris Pincock for invaluable feed-back and support throughout the writing of this paper. Additional thanks go to Ethan Brauer, Steven Dalglish, Preston Lennon, and Damon Stanley for helpful comments and discussion. Early versions of this paper were presented to audiences at the 2019 Ohio State Fink Ceremony and the 2019 meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy. I wish to thank the members of each audience for their questions. Finally, I wish to thank three anonymous referees whose insightful comments and suggestions significantly improved the final version.",

year = "2022",

month = dec,

doi = "10.1086/714791",

language = "English",

volume = "73",

journal = "British Journal for the Philosophy of Science",

issn = "0007-0882",