Why Intuition?

Jennifer NADO

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)peer-review

31 Citations (Scopus)


In this paper I will argue that this entire dialectic is somewhat misguided. The mental states which are generally assumed to fall under the category of ‘intuition’ likely comprise a highly heterogeneous group; from the point of view of psychology or of neuroscience, in fact, ‘intuitions’ appear to be generated by several fundamentally different sorts of mental processes. If this is correct, then the term ‘intuition’ may simply carve things too broadly. I will argue that it is a mistake to focus on the ‘reliability of intuition’; empirical evidence suggests that the reliability of one type of intuition may tell us next to nothing about the reliability of other types. Rather than debating the evidential status of intuition as a whole, philosophers interested in methodology would do well to focus their investigations much more narrowly.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)15-41
Number of pages27
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Issue number1
Early online date21 Nov 2012
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2014


Dive into the research topics of 'Why Intuition?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this