Abstract
Harry Chalmers argues that monogamy involves restricting one’s partner’s access to goods in a morally troubling way that is analogous to an agreement between partners to have no additional friends. Chalmers finds the traditional defenses of monogamy wanting, since they would also justify a friendship-restricting agreement. I show why three traditional defenses of monogamy hold up quite well and why they don’t, for the most part, also justify friendship-restricting agreements (and why it doesn’t seem to matter when they do). In many cases, monogamy can be justified on grounds of practicality, specialness, or jealousy.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 539-552 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Journal of Value Inquiry |
Volume | 54 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 12 Dec 2019 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Dec 2020 |
Bibliographical note
Thanks for Francesco Orsi, Derek Baker, Merily Salura, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments, notes, and conversations.Funding was provided by Hong Kong PhD Fellowship Scheme.