Projects per year
Byrne (Philos Top 33:79–104, 2005; Self-knowledge, 2011a; Consciousness of the self: new essays, 2011b; Proc Aristot Soc Suppl Vol 85:201–219, 2011c; Introspection and consciousnes, 2012) offers a novel interpretation of the idea that the mind is transparent to its possessor, and that one knows one’s own mind by looking out at the world. This paper argues that his (Byrne, Proc Aristot Soc Suppl Vol 85:201–219, 2011c; Introspection and consciousnes, 2012) attempts to extend this picture of self-knowledge force him to sacrifice the theoretical parsimony he presents as the primary virtue of his account. The paper concludes by discussing two general problems transparency accounts of self-knowledge must address.
Bibliographical noteThe research in this paper was substantially funded by a grant from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. LU342612).
- Inference rules
- Alex Byrne