Zhuangzi's Knowing-How and Skepticism

Wai Wai CHIU

doi:10.1353/pew.2018.0097

Zhuangzi's Knowing-How and Skepticism

Wai Wai CHIU

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Journal Publications › Journal Article (refereed) › peer-review

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A common interpretation of the Zhuangzi holds that the text is skeptical only about propositional knowledge and not practical knowledge. It is argued here that this interpretation is problematic, for two reasons. The first is that there is no motivation for Zhuangzi to criticize propositional knowledge, given some general pre-Qin epistemological assumptions. The second is that Zhuangzi explicitly criticizes a certain kind of practical knowledge. It is then explained how Zhuangzi's skepticism can co-exist with the idea of "great knowledge."

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1062-1084
Number of pages	23
Journal	Philosophy East and West
Volume	68
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2018.0097
Publication status	Published - Oct 2018

Bibliographical note

A draft version was presented at the 2015 International Conference on the Contemporary Significance of Zhuangzi’s Philosophy at Taipei. I thank organizers and participants who gave me much feedback and inspiration. I also thank an anonymous reviewer who raised stylistic and organizational issues.

Funding

The work described in this essay was substantially supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (LU 23603516).

Access to Document

10.1353/pew.2018.0097

Cite this

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Zhuangzi's Knowing-How and Skepticism

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

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Zhuangzi's Conception of Knowledge (《莊子》論「知」)

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Zhuangzi's Knowing-How and Skepticism

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

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Zhuangzi's Conception of Knowledge (《莊子》論「知」)

Cite this