Zhuangzi's Knowing-How and Skepticism

Research output: Journal PublicationsJournal Article (refereed)

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A common interpretation of the Zhuangzi holds that the text is skeptical only about propositional knowledge and not practical knowledge. It is argued here that this interpretation is problematic, for two reasons. The first is that there is no motivation for Zhuangzi to criticize propositional knowledge, given some general pre-Qin epistemological assumptions. The second is that Zhuangzi explicitly criticizes a certain kind of practical knowledge. It is then explained how Zhuangzi's skepticism can co-exist with the idea of "great knowledge."
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1062-1084
Number of pages23
JournalPhilosophy East and West
Volume68
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 4 Oct 2018

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Zhuangzi's Knowing-How and Skepticism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Projects

    Cite this